Taint Nobody Got Time for Crash Analysis
Crash Analysis
Triage Goals

Execution Path
- What code paths were executed
- What parts of the execution interacted with external data

Input Determination
- Which input bytes influence the crash

Exploitability
- Does this crash have a security impact
  - Read Access – Information Leak
    - ASLR Bypass
  - Write Access – Data Modification
    - Credentials
    - Control Flow
  - Execute Access – Game Over
Common Scenarios

Fuzzing
- Spray ‘n Pray
- Grammar-based
- “Fuzzing with Code Fragments”

Static Analysis
- Intra-procedural Analysis Tools
- Manual code review

Third Party
- In-the-wild exploitation
- Vulnerability response teams
- Vulnerability brokers
Existing Tools

Execution Path
- Process Stalker, CoverIt (hexblog), BlockCov, IDA PIN Block Trace
- Bitblaze, Taintgrind, VDT

Input Determination
- delta, tmin, diff

Exploitability
- !exploitable
- CrashWrangler
- CERT Triage Tools
Automation Methods

Execution Path
  ◦ Code Coverage
  ◦ Taint Analysis

Input Determination
  ◦ Slicing

Exploitability
  ◦ Symbolic Execution
  ◦ Abstract Interpretation
Automation Methods

Execution Path
- Code Coverage
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- Abstract Interpretation
Taint Analysis
Concept

Formally – Information Flow Analysis
  ◦ Type of dataflow analysis
  ◦ Can be static or dynamic, often hybrid
  ◦ Applied to track user controlled data through execution

Methodology
  ◦ Define taint sources
  ◦ Single-step execution
  ◦ Apply taint propagation policy for each instruction
  ◦ Apply taint checks (if any)
Define Taint Sources

- Hook I/O Functions
- Look for taint sources
  - File name, network ip:port, etc
  - Track tainted file descriptor
- Single-step
- Add future data reads from taint source descriptors to the taint tracking engine
- Apply taint policy on each instruction
Define Taint Sources

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  - File name, network ip:port, etc
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**Explicit Taint Propagation**

```
A = TAINT()
B = A
C = B + 1
D = C * B
E = *(D)
```

**Implicit Taint Propagation**

```
A = TAINT()
IF A > B:
    C = TRUE
ELSE:
    C = FALSE
```
Implementation Details

We utilize a tracer forked from the Binary Analysis Platform from Carnegie-Mellon University to facilitate taint tracing

- Originally wrote separate PIN based tracer
- BAP’s tracer is also a Pintool
- Worked with the authors of BAP since early 2012 to improve the tracer so it performs acceptably against complex COTS software targets on Windows
- Added code coverage and memory dump collection to our private version

PIN supplies a robust API and framework for binary instrumentation

- Supports easily hooking I/O functions for taint sources
- High performance single-stepping
- Supports instrumenting at instruction level for taint propagation / checks
Implementation Details

Taint Propagation Policy

- Tree of tainted references to registers and bytes of memory are individually tracked
- If input operands contain taint, propagate to all output operands
- No control flow tainting
- Optionally taint index registers
  - All index registers for LEA instructions are tainted

- No support for MMX, Floating point FCMOV, SSE PREFETCH
Taint Visualization Demo
.text:0048871 ; ----------- SUBROUTINE -----------
..text:0048872 proc near ; CODE XREF: nice_crash!
..text:0048873 arg_h = dword ptr 8
..text:0048874 mov esi, [esp+arg_h]
..text:0048875 xor eax, eax

..text:0048876 lodsb
..text:0048877 @context "R_EAX" = 0x0, 0, u32, wr @context "R_ESI" = 0x9cb0000, 0, u32, rd
..text:0048878 @context "EFLAGS" = 0x264, 0, u32, rd
..text:0048879 @context "mem[0x9cb0000]" = 0x41, 1, u8, rd
..text:0048880 label pc 0x8008878
..text:0048881 T_32t1:u32 = R_DFLAGS:u32
..text:0048882 T_32t2:u32 = R_ESI:u32
..text:0048883 T_8t2:u8 = mem[0x32][T_32t1:u32, e little]:u8
..text:0048884 R_EAX:u32 = R_EAX:u32 & 0xffffffff:u32 | pad:u32(T_8t2:u8)
..text:0048885 T_32t3:u32 = T_32t1:u32 + T_32t0:u32
..text:0048886 R_ESI:u32 = T_32t3:u32

..text:0048887 xor edi, edi
..text:0048888 add edi, eax

..text:0048889 @context "R_EDI" = 0x0, 0, u32, rw
..text:0048890 @context "R_EAX" = 0x41, 1, u32, rd @context "EFLAGS" = 0x246, 0, u32, wr
..text:0048891 label pc 0x8088767
..text:0048892 T_4t2:u32 = R_EDI:u32 + T_32t2:u32
..text:0048893 R_CF:bool = R_EDI:u32 < T_4t2:u32
..text:0048894 R_OF:bool = 0x10:u32 == (0x10:u32 & (R_EDI:u32 ^ T_4t2:u32 ^ T_32t2:u32))
..text:0048895 R_PF:bool = high:bool((T_4t2:u32 ^ T_32t2:u32) & (T_4t2:u32 ^ R_EDI:u32))
..text:0048896 sub edi, 30h

..text:0048897 @context "R_EDI" = 0x41, 1, u32, rw
..text:0048898 @context "EFLAGS" = 0x246, 1, u32, wr
..text:0048899 label pc 0x8048870
..text:004889a T_32t2:u32 = R_EDI:u32 - 0x30:u32
..text:004889b R_OF:bool = high:bool((T_32t2:u32 ^ 0x30:u32) & (T_32t2:u32 ^ R_EDI:u32))
..text:004889d R_SF:bool = high:bool(R_EDI:u32)
..text:004889e R_ZF:bool = 0:u32 == R_EDI:u32
..text:004889f sub edi, 30h

..text:00488a0 ; ...
Design Considerations

Taint Policy
- Implicit Information Flows
  - Over-tainting
    - Most common when applying implicit taint via control flow
  - Under-tainting
    - If control flow taint is ignored

Performance
- Execution Speed
  - Analysis on each instruction is expensive
  - Avoid context switching
- Memory Overhead
Trace Slicing
Concept

Trace slicing finds the sub-graph of dependencies between two nodes
- All nodes that influence or are influenced by specified node can be isolated
- Reachability Problem

Forward Slicing
- Slice forward to determine instructions influenced by selected value

Backward Slicing
- Slice backward to locate the instructions influencing a value
- Collect constraints to determine the degree of control over the value
Concept

Methodology
- Collect trace
- Convert native assembler to IL
- Select location and value of interest (register or memory address)
- Select direction of slice
- Follow dependencies in desired direction to produce sub-graph
Forward Slicing

Slice forward to determine instructions influenced by a value

\[ S = \{v\} \]
For each stmt in statements:
  If \( \text{vars(stmt.rhs)} \cap S \neq \emptyset \) then
    \[ S := S \cup \{\text{stmt.lhs}\} \]
  else
    \[ S := S \setminus \{\text{stmt.lhs}\} \]
Return \( S \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>stmt</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>\text{el_size, el_count, el_data = read()}</td>
<td>{\text{el_size}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{total_size = el_size * el_count}</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\text{buf = malloc(total_size)}</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>while count &lt; el_count</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\quad offset = count * el_size</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size, offset}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\quad data_offset = el_data + offset</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size, offset, data_offset}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\quad buf_offset = buf + offset</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size, offset, data_offset, buf_offset}}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\quad memcpy(buf_offset, data_offset, el_size)</td>
<td>{\text{el_size, total_size, offset, data_offset, buf_offset}}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Backward Slicing

Slice backward to locate the instructions influencing a value

\[
S = \{v\}
\]

For each stmt in reverse(statements):
  If \{stmt.lhs\} \cap S \neq \emptyset then
    \[
    S := S - \{\text{stmt.rhs}\}
    \]
    \[
    S := S \cup \text{vars(stmt.rhs)}
    \]

Return S

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<td>{data_offset, el_data, offset}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buf_offset = buf + offset</td>
<td>{data_offset}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>memcpy(buf_offset, data_offset, el_size)</td>
<td>{data_offset}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Implementation Details

BAP includes an intermediate assembly language definition called BIL

BIL expands each native assembly instruction into a sequence of micro operations that make native instruction side effects explicit

We only have to handle assignments of the form \texttt{var := exp}

We concretize the trace and convert to SSA to create unique labels for each assignment

\begin{verbatim}
program ::= stmt*
stmt ::= var := exp | jmp(exp) | cjmp(exp,exp,exp) | halt(exp) | assert(exp) | label label_kind | special(string)
\end{verbatim}
Implementation Details

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We only have to handle assignments of the form \( var := exp \)

We concretize the trace and convert to SSA to create unique labels for each assignment

```plaintext
.text:08048887   mov edx, [edi+1122344h] ;
.text:08048887   ; @context "R_EDX" = 0x1000, 0, u32, wr
.text:08048887   ; @context "REDI" = 0x11, 1, u32, rd
.text:08048887   ; @context "mem[0x11223355]" = 0x0, 0, u8, rd
.text:08048887   ; @context "mem[0x11223356]" = 0x0, 0, u8, rd
.text:08048887   ; @context "mem[0x11223357]" = 0x0, 0, u8, rd
.text:08048887   ; @context "mem[0x11223358]" = 0x0, 0, u8, rd
.text:08048887   ; label pc_0x8048887
.text:08048887   ; R_EDX:u32 = mem:?u32[R_EIDI:u32 + 0x11223344:u32, e_little]:u32
```
Backslice Demo
Design Considerations

Under-tainting Implicit Flows
- Backslice by “size” stops at node C because of a constant assignment
  - “size” is implicitly dependent on e1, but not on e2

Over-tainting
- APIs that hold state created by a previously tainted value may indicate taint in later calls
- Inflates the trace size by including calls with untainted arguments
- Example: malloc(tainted_size) could permanently taint the allocator’s internal structures
Symbolic Execution
Concept

Symbolic execution lets us “execute” a series of instructions without using concrete values for variables.

Instead of a numeric output, we get a formula for the output in terms of input variables that represents a potential range of values.

Given a crash state, analyze potential paths to find exploitable condition:
- A path is exploitable if it meets prior path constraints and contains a tainted memory write or control transfer.
Concept

Methodology

- Pick an initial state
  - Trace taint until point of interest
  - Store process state and memory image
- Choose desired future state
  - Depth-First Search for all future states
- Encode program logic from initial state to future state into SMT formula
- Initialize values in the SMT formula with saved program state
  - Replace one or more concrete values with symbolic value
- Solve formula with SMT solver
SMT Solvers

In very simple terms
  ◦ You ask a question, solver tries to answer

Question:

```
work, sleep, lulz = Ints('work sleep lulz')

solve(work >= 40,   # 40+ hour work week
      sleep >= 42,   # 6+ hours sleep/day
      lulz >= work,    # work/lulz balance
      work + sleep + lulz == 168) # 168 hours/week
```

Answer:

```
[sleep = 42, lulz = 63, work = 63]
```
SMT Solvers

In very simple terms
- You ask a question, solver tries to answer

Question:

```plaintext
x, y = Reals('x y')
solve(x**2 + y**2 < 1,
     2*x + y > 1),
     z**2 == 1/(x * y))
```

Answer:

```plaintext
[x = 1/8, y = 7/8, z = -3.0237157840?]
```
SMT Solvers

What’s the point?

- Translate program’s code into SMT-acceptable format
- Ask questions and possibly get some answers!

```
add eax, ebx
xor ebx, ebx
sub ecx, 0x123
setz bl
add eax, ebx
```

Is this snippet equivalent to “add eax, ebx”? 
SMT Solvers

assert( 0bin1 = (let initial_EBX_77_0 = R_EBX_6
    in
        (let initial_EAX_78_1 = R_EAX_5
            in
                (let R_EAX_80_2 = BVPLUS(32, R_EAX_5, R_EBX_6)
                    in
                        (let R_ECX_117_3 = BVSUB(32, R_ECX_7, 0hex00000123)
                            in
                                (let R_ZF_144_4 = IF (0hex00000000=R_ECX_117_3) THEN
                                    0bin1 ENDIF 0bin0 ENDIF IN
                                    (let R_EAX_149_5 = BVPLUS(32, R_EAX_80_2,
                                        (0bin00000000000000000000000000000000 @ R_ZF_144_4))
                                        in
                                            (let final_EAX_180_6 = R_EAX_149_5 IN
                                                IF (NOT(final_EAX_180_6=BVPLUS(32,
                                                    initial_EAX_78_1,initial_EBX_77_0))) THEN
                                                    );
                                                QUERY(FALSE);
                                                COUNTEREXAMPLE;
                                            )
                                        )
                                    )
                                )
                            )
                        )
                    )
                )
            )
        )
    )
);
Satisfiability

Don’t explore any further

X<2
true
X>2
false
X<2 && x>2
-> UNSAT
X<2 && ~(x>2)
-> SAT

OK to explore, since the path’s predicate is satisfiable
Implementation details

BAP’s tracer has been modified to collect registers, taint information and a memory snapshot when a crash occurs.

Symbolic executor (motriage) uses this state as a starting point.

motriage continues execution using variables instead of constants for unmapped memory:

\[ \text{mov eax, [ebx]} \Rightarrow \text{eax} := \text{new\_variable()} \text{ iff [ebx] is undefined} \]

Taint is propagated for each instruction.

Each instruction’s semantics is appended to our formula, using symbolic variables where necessary.
Implementation details

For each code branch, motriage forks its state (registers, memory, taint info) and updates the current path’s predicate:

- **True path:** \( \text{path\_pred} \land \text{cond} \)
- **False path:** \( \text{path\_pred} \land \neg\text{cond} \)

The SMT formula is then solved for each new path

- If the path’s predicate becomes UNSAT, stop exploring that path

Continue the DFS search until SUCCESS or FAIL condition is met
Implementation Details

Terminate with FAIL condition, if:

- Path is unsatisfiable (determined with a SMT solver):
  - Path is unsatisfiable (determined with a SMT solver):
    - “A” can’t be reached, so it’s not analyzed
    - Unknown (and untainted) jump target
      - We can’t follow `jmp eax`, if `eax` is symbolic
    - Symbolic (and untainted) write
      - `mov [eax], 0`
        - If EAX is symbolic but untainted, then we have no idea where exactly are we writing
        - All future reads would have to take that into account – too much trouble
    - Max number of instructions or branches
Triage Tool Demo
void test_motriage(unsigned int *buf) {
    unsigned int b, x, y;
    b = buf[0];
    x = buf[b+0x11223344];
    y = buf[x];
    exploit_me(1, x, y);
}

void exploit_me(int depth, unsigned int x, unsigned int y) {
    int stack[1];
    int b, i;
    b = x & 0xff;
    switch(depth) {
        case 4:
            if(b == 0x44) stack[y] = 1;
            for(i=0; i < 4; i++) stack[i] = 0x29a;
            return;
        case 3:
            if(b != 0x33) y = 0;
            break;
        case 2:
            if(b != 0x22) y = 0;
            break;
        case 1:
            if(b != 0x11) y = 0;
            break;
        default:
            assert(0);
    }
    exploit_me(++depth, x>>8, y);
}
Performance

Two factors: number of branches and code size

- Running time exponential in number of branches
- N branches require n forks, so $2^n$ possible paths to analyze
- For branchless code you pay the same as in a software emulator (linear time)

How deep do you want to search?

- First, you need to get to the controlled write without crashing
- Then you need to perform a write to address constrained by all the conditional branches you passed
- The farther the write is, the less likely it’s going to be useful
- Eventually path explosion will meet hardware limits
False positives

False Positives
* Every read from unmapped (or symbolic) address creates a new symbolic variable
* We don’t know what exactly we are reading, so we don’t know what constraints should be asserted on these variables
* Consider an example:
  
  \[
  \text{Let } x, y \text{ be tainted variables and for all } i, \text{ mem}[i] \% 2 == 0
  \]

  \[
  \begin{align*}
  z &= \text{mem}[x]; \\
  \text{if}(z \% 2 == 1) \{ \\
  \quad \text{mem}[y] &= 0; \\
  \}
  \end{align*}
  \]

* Our approach incorrectly reports a SUCCESS on mem[y] = 0, despite this path being unsatisfiable
Conclusion

Value of a crash is related to our ability to perform difficult analysis

Automation solutions are needed to keep up with crash generation

Combined with slicing, taint analysis greatly reduces manual analysis time for gathering data flow information

Symbolic execution, seeded with taint information, allows us automatically to reason about exploitability of a crash with a higher degree of accuracy that previous solutions
Thank You

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- [http://bap.ece.cmu.edu/](http://bap.ece.cmu.edu/)